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AND THE PARTY IN THE URALS REGION
1918-1953
 
Who did the Soviet political police answer to? Few existing studies of the Soviet
“organs” (Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, MGB, MVD) analyse in depth the significance





 of political police officials worked in the regions,
subordinated at the same time both to regional party committee, and to the central
“organs” in Moscow. Many scholars have nevertheless worked from the
assumption that the apparatus of the political police as a whole was a tool of the




 However, even some Cold
War-era studies hesitated to accept such assumptions without qualification. In
 
Smolensk under Soviet rule
 
, Merle Fainsod pointed out that in the 1930s the
regional party recruited most officials of the political police, and that the regional
party secretary “directly handled problems involving [them].” To what extent did
the local agents of the political police answer to the local party and not the centre?
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The Cheka: Lenin’s political police
 
 (Oxford, 1986): 100. Leggett suggests
that in 1918 there were 9,000 cadres in the regions versus 1,300 in Moscow headquarters (not
including border guards and troops). By 1944, there were 367,350 in the regions versus 7,450 in
the centre. A further 400,462 worked in the Gulag system. B. A. Starkov, “Gosudarstvo v
gosudarstve. Evoliutsiia OGPU-NKVD-MVD-KGB” (unpublished).
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134; Boris Levytsky, 
 
The uses of terror: the Soviet secret service, 1917-1970
 
 (London, 1971):
65; John J. Dziak, 
 
Chekisty: A history of the KGB
 
 (Lexington, Mass., 1988) : 52. Others go so
far as to argue that the political police was determining the direction of state policy. See for
example Robert Conquest, 
 
Inside Stalin’s secret polic
 
e (Stanford, 1985): ix.
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Almost thirty years later, in his study of the Cheka, George Leggett examined the
controversies over the relationship of the regional political police organs and
regional Soviet and party authorities in the early years of the Soviet regime.
Hampered, as was Fainsod, by the poverty of the sources, he nevertheless observed









shows that the relationship of the regional political police and regional party
organisations could be both collaborative and antagonistic. In the decade and a half
of Soviet power, it was more collaborative than perhaps the central leadership
might have preferred. In the Urals region, the fact that the party apparatus
appointed, paid and provided perks of employment to political police officials




 While the local Cheka/
OGPU/NKVD officials responded loyally to directives of the central leadership,
they also served and protected their local masters. At first, dual subordination
involved few contradictions, but by the early 1930s the local and central agendas
had diverged substantially. When this was discovered, in the course of the Great
Terror, new measures were introduced to safeguard the independence of the
NKVD. After 1937, antagonism, rather than collaboration, characterised the
relationship of the regional political police and party organisations in the Urals
region.





deepened in the course of the 1920s. The local ChK/OGPU helped the party
leaders fend off challenges from party “oppositions.” They helped local party
leaders promote regional economic plans. When the five-year plan descended
into crisis and the centre demanded complete and unquestioning fulfilment, the
political police began to defend the regional party leaders from the pressures of
the command-administrative order, in contradiction of the spirit and substance of
directives from their superiors in Moscow. The local political police




 “family circle” or
“clique.” His key function was to find scapegoats for problems of production, to
find “wreckers” and “saboteurs” in order to evade investigation from the centre.
When Moscow nevertheless uncovered these tactics in 1937, the vestiges of dual
subordination were eliminated in favour of strict subordination to Moscow. The
effect imposing an antagonistic political police on the local party organs was to
destabilise politics in the regions, and to make terror a fact of everyday political
life.
 














subsequently approved by the Central Committee.
 




ChK/GPU and the local “oppositions”
 
In the Urals region, the relationship of the regional party leaders and the Cheka/
OGPU tended from the outset to be mutually supportive. The regional party organs
had responsibility for the selection of political police officials and they paid their
wages. These officials were, in turn, inclined to protect party officials from





”) that the relationship was initially forged.
On the eve of the February Revolution, there were approximately 24,000
members in the Bolshevik underground. By the end of the Civil War, over 700,000




 As a consequence of the colossal
rate of growth, the general quality of officialdom was extremely low in terms of
basic literacy, administrative skills and even loyalty to the party. Particularly in the
immediate aftermath of the October seizure of power, many had joined the
Bolshevik party in order to take advantage of the privileged access to food, housing
and jobs accorded to members. At the very height of the Civil War, in 1919, the
party leadership had felt compelled to initiate a purge of corrupt and “morally
dissolute” members. The long struggle against the White Armies, combined with
political training in the army did reinforce loyalty to the party, and literacy
campaigns raised educational levels, but corruption and incompetence remained
serious problems in administration.
Ironically, the more talented, experienced and ambitious party members
presented a far more troubling problem. This narrower, though still substantial,
group competed for a limited number of leading positions. Not everyone could be a
provincial party committee secretary, a department head in a commissariat, even a
district party committee secretary or village soviet chairman. Throughout the
growing party and state bureaucracy, officials wanted to give orders, not to take
them. As the bureaucracy absorbed new cadres, struggles for power erupted at all
levels in the drive to capture the “responsible positions” within and among
organisations. Local officials were locked in struggle with cadres sent in from
Moscow. New recruits to the party refused to accept the seniority of members with
underground experience. Soviet executive committee chairmen refused to follow









 In part, the struggles were fuelled by




 leaders. Policy disputes were a matter of
principle for some Bolsheviks, but for others they were an excuse to attack the
position and authority of their opponents. No senior official could be sure that one
 
6. T. H. Rigby, 
 
Communist party membership in the USSR, 1917-1967
 
 (Princeton, N. J.,
1968): 7-8, 52.
7. On the variety of conflicts in party organizations, see Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv
Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), f. 17, op. 34, d. 110 Materialy k XII s’’ezdu RKP(b)












pervaded the apparatus, paralysing entire organisations throughout the country.
The Urals regional organisation was no exception. In the first years after the
revolution, the regional party leaders constantly complained to the Central
Committee of the poor quality of cadres, drunkenness, abuses of power, but also of
insubordination and power struggles. In 1918, the discussion of the Brest-Litovsk
Peace deeply divided the regional party as almost half the organisation opposed the
Treaty. Several years on, little had improved. Drunkenness and abuses of power
remained just as common as before. Meanwhile, the struggle with the White Army
had left much of local industry in ruins and much of the countryside was in the
midst of famine. Just as there was a great need for decisive action, a new
controversy — this time on the role of trade unions — split the organisation. In
advance of the X Party Congress, the “Workers Opposition,” had gained significant
support in the larger urban party organisations. Though they were defeated in most
votes in the region, and at the party Congress, the local leaders of the Opposition,





 A year later, Mrachkovskii and Ufimtsev led a new





 Again they were defeated, and again they continued their attacks. The
ban on factions, instituted at the X Congress, had little immediate effect. They





For nearly five more years the same core group of “oppositionists” railed against
the regional party organisation both within regular party meetings and in public
demonstrations. But thanks to the services of the OGPU, they were less a threat
than an irritation. OGPU compiled an exhaustive list of active oppositionists and




 They regularly reported all incidents of “oppositionist activity”
to the regional party leadership and the regional control commission. Regional




And yet, should we not assume that the OGPU was acting on behalf of Stalin
rather than the regional organisations? And that the struggle against oppositions in
the regions was only a part of his struggle against his own political opponents?
 
8. Tsentr Dokumentatsii Obshchestvennykh Organizatsii Sverdlovskoi Oblasti (TsDOO SO),
f. 41 Istpart, op. 1, d. 134 Obrashchenie Ekaterinburzhskoi organizatsii RKP(b) ko vsem
organizatsiiam i kommunisticheskim iacheikam Urala s pryzyvom podderzhivat’ leninskuiu
platformu i t. d. 1921 g., ll. 25-33.
9. TsDOO SO, f. 1494 Uralbiuro TsK, op. 1, d. 34 Tsirkuliary i telegrammy za podpisiami
sekretarei TsK RKP(b) po voprosam partiinoi raboty i partiinym kadram, ll. 42-43.
10. TsDOO SO, f. 1494 Uralbiuro TsK, op. 1, d. 78 Politicheskii obzor i otchety o rabote
Ural’skogo biuro TsK RKP(b) dekabr’ 1921-avgust 1922, l. 75.
11. The OGPU list of the 115 leaders of the Left Opposition in the Urals (1927) is found in
TsDOO SO, f. 4 Obkom, op. 5 1927, d. 30 Spravki, dokladnye telegrammy, akty doprosov o





., ll. 67, 76.
 




Wasn’t the local OGPU taking orders from Stalin through the central political
police organs? What is striking is the confluence of the interests of Stalin and the
regional leaders. At the time Stalin was named General Secretary, the main subject
of correspondence between the Secretariat and regional party organisations was the








 Regional party secretaries constantly appealed to the
Secretariat for assistance in the resolution of power struggles. There is little
evidence to suggest that the Secretariat or Stalin was directing the struggle against
oppositions, or enforcing conformity to any set of policies or “political line.”





 The simplest way to do so was to clarify and strengthen the hierarchy of
existing party and state organisations, and reinforce the powers of the current
“bosses,” most notably, the network of local party secretaries. The resolutions of
the XII Party Congress (April 1923) strengthened the role of party secretaries in
selecting “responsible workers of the soviet, economic, co-operative and
professional organisations” in their regions. In effect, the party secretaries became
the main arbiters of the struggles, with the power to remove officials who refused to
submit to their decisions. Stalin further supported regional organisations by
encouraging them to label as anti-party “group struggle” any attempt to challenge
to their rule. This he did by advocating the restriction of intra-party democracy.
At the XIII Party Congress, the Left Oppositions demanded a strengthening of
intra-party democracy including such measures as a restoration of elections to




 To any party secretary, the
implications of such a program were immediately clear. They would be open to
attack from any disgruntled party member, to say nothing of groups of
“comrades” who might want to topple them from their leadership posts. Stalin
told them what they wanted to hear. 





) that would be fatal in the “current
conditions” of the New Economic Policy:
 
13. See for example, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 67, d. 6 Protokoly i pis’ma Astrakhanskogo gubkoma
VKP(b) i otvetstvennykh rabotnikov o vystupleniiakh oppozitsii, l. 16; d. 109 Vypiski
protokolov zasedanii i zakrytye pis’ma Kostromskogo gubkoma RKP(b), ll. 168-169; d. 249
Perepiska s TsK KP(b)U i dokladnye zapiski, spravki i drugie dokumenty po voprosam sostava,
sostoianiia i raboty partiinykh organizatsii, o vystupleniiakh oppozitsii, l. 68.
14. 
 
KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s’’ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK
 
 (Moscow,
1984): 74, 99. The research of the Information department suggests that the regional secretaries
were not shy about asserting those powers. RGASPI, f. 81 Lichnoe delo Lazara Moiseevich
Kaganovicha, op. 3, d. 69 Dokladnye zapiski, spravki i drugie dokumenty orgraspredotdela
TsK RKP(b) po voprosam organizatsionno-partiinoi raboty, ll. 189-191 Spravka
Informatsionnogo otdela “O rukovodstve sovetskoi, khoziaistvennoi, kooperativnoi i
professional’noi rabote so storony partkomov”. Kaganovich was the chairman of the
Organisation-Distribution department at the time.
15. See Evgenii Preobrazhenskii’s speech to the XIII Party Congress. 
 
Trinadtsataia
konferentsiia RKP(b). Stenograficheskii otchet
 






“If we were to permit the existence of group struggle, we would destroy the
party, turn it from a monolithic, united organisation into an alliance of groups




The “retreat” from democracy proved to be very durable. Party secretaries were
pleased to repeat Stalin’s phrases about the importance of party unity and use them




 And as the regional
secretaries took action against all those who engaged in “group struggle,” they
made organised opposition to Stalin almost impossible.
Documents of regional and central archives leave no doubt that Stalin and the
central party leadership were kept well informed of the activities of oppositionists




 The local OGPU




 control commissions, which sent regular reports to




 The commissions began to expel oppositionists




 Was the local OGPU, in this instance,
directed by the regional party organs, or by the central OGPU, the central
leadership, if not by Stalin himself? Well into the late 1920s, these relationships
remained close, and mutually reinforcing. The regional archives suggest that the
regional party was directing the local OGPU, with the approval, or at least the
knowledge, of the centre. But in the early years of the “Stalin revolution” evidence
emerges of local OGPU actions, directed by the regional party, of which the centre












party democracy (December 17, 1925) TsDOO SO, f. 4 Obkom, op. 4 1926, d. 47 Doklad, itogi
obsuzhdeniia diskussii XIV s’’ezda VKP(b) v partiinykh organizatsiiakh Urala, l. 101.
18. See for example RGASPI, f. 17, op. 67, d. 249, l. 68 (Ukraine); d. 285 Zakrytye pis’ma i
dokladnye zapiski Ural’skogo obkoma RKP(b), raikomov i okruzhkomov RKP(b) oblasti,
orgraspredotdela i instruktorov TsK RKP(b) ob ekonomicheskom i politicheskom polozhenii
oblasti, o sostoianii i deiatel’nosti partorganizatsii, perepiska po voprosam ucheta
kommunistov i dr. sentiabr’ 1925-noiabria 1925, l. 102 (Urals); d. 378 Dokladnye zapiski,
spravki informotdela, instruktorov TsK i Tverskogo gubkoma VKP(b) o sostoianii i rabote
gubernskoi partiinoi organizatsii, o vypolnenii postanovlenii TsK po dokladu gubkoma, ob
obsledovanii postanovki massovoi raboty na predpriiatiiakh Tverskogo khlebo-bulochnogo
tresta, ob oppozitsionnykh vystupleniiakh i dr. oktiabr’ 1926- ianvaria 1928, l. 192 (Tver’);
d. 193 Doklady i zakrytye pis’ma Irkutskogo gubkoma VKP(b) i drugie dokumenty ob
ekonomicheskom i politicheskom polozhenii gubernii, o rabote partiinoi organizatsii, o
fraktsionnoi deiatel’nosti oppozitsii, o vydvizhenii rabochikh i krest’ian i vovlechenii v
obshchestvennuiu rabotu i drugie, l. 98.
19. TsDOO SO, f. 4 Obkom, op. 5 1927, d. 30 Spravki, dokladnye, telegrammy, akty dokladov





., ll. 133-135; 
 
Dva goda raboty: Materialy k otchetu Ural’skogo Obkoma VKP(b) k












OGPU and the plan
 
In the mid-1920s, the regions exerted considerable pressure on the centre to expand
levels of investment and construction. Regional leaders perceived that central
investment in the local economy was the key to regional economic health.
Modernisation of the existing capital stock and new construction improved the
efficiency of production, which increased the ability to sustain the competition for





), uncompetitive — and thus
unprofitable — industries were shut down. Profitable ones brought the regions tax
income, employment and the potential for further reinvestment and growth.
Enterprise profit was an important part of capital investment, but Soviet industry
was still too weak to generate internally a significant rate of growth. Central





In this context, the five-year plan was a matter of particular concern for the
regions. They understood that five years of central investment would have a
profound impact on the state and status of the regional economy. As the five-year
plan emerged from its preliminary outlines toward its final version, it was the object
of ever-greater controversy and conflict. Each region tried to prove that its own
contribution was indispensable, that it could produce better, faster and less
expensively than the others were. In the process, interregional competition created
further upward pressure on the levels of investment and construction. It also
exacerbated existing tensions between those who believed in a revolutionary
potential of the planned economy and those who understood the essence of
planning to be thorough and careful calculation. Within the regions, the fear of
losing five-year plan investment to competing regions drove support for ambitious
proposals, but it also led to conflicts within the regional leadership and between the
regional party and economic officials over the capacity of regional economy to
achieve them. In the centre, the enthusiasts of high tempo industrialisation, led by
Stalin, were able to manipulate these conflicts for their political ends. The Shakhty
trial and the campaign against the “Right danger” — both signals to attack
opposition to high tempos — served not only Stalin’s desire to gain control of the
central leadership, but also the determination of many regional leaders to promote
ambitious plans. 
Within the party leadership, there was considerable support for testing the upper
limits of investment and growth, but there was also concern for the potentially
disruptive effects of an over-aggressive industrialisation program–in particular, the
danger of a break with the peasantry. Within the central economic and planning
organs the issue of the tempo of industrialisation was the subject of ever-sharper






21. James R. Harris, 
 
The Great Urals: Regionalism and the evolution of the Soviet system
 






NKFin and NKZem fought to restrain tempos. Each group was convinced of the
dire consequences to the economy of a failure to accept their plans. At the same
time, a more important set of conflicts was emerging within each of the economic
organs. The debates had brought forth a division between non-party specialists and
their party colleagues, between “bourgeois” specialists and their soviet-trained
counterparts.
In the Urals, regional party leaders were absorbed with the task of maximising
industrial investment and growth, but they could not agree on how far or how fast
they should proceed. They disagreed as to how ambitious regional plans could be,
how hard they could push the centre for investment in the Urals and how hard they
could push local trusts and enterprises to produce. Enterprise directors were not
opposed to high “tempos,” but the accompanying pressures on their performance
disturbed many. “Bourgeois” specialists were perhaps the most troubled by the
demands for improved efficiency and the sudden acceleration of industrialisation.
As the question of sustaining growth rates became a matter of blinkered
determination for many Bolsheviks, some specialists found themselves unable, or
unwilling, to fulfil their roles. And yet the steady advance of Ukraine’s ambitions
and the danger of being passed over for first five-year plan investment lent new




 lost patience with any hesitation to
meet the Ukrainian threat head-on.
In April 1927, the central party apparatus began to take an active interest in local




 received a letter from the Central
Committee Information Department requesting information on “incidents of









, some members of the central leadership took a dark view of
local resistance. That same month, the OGPU took a newly active interest in









 leaders warned that 
“a sudden increase of accidents, explosions and fires at enterprises and
construction sites of all-union significance has been observed [...] Taking into
account the seriousness of the situation, the organs of the OGPU have been
given a broader range of powers, including both the defence of the enterprises
themselves and punitive functions [...].
The organs of the OGPU have been given directives to remove from all the most
important state enterprises and construction sites politically unreliable elements





22. TsDOO SO, f. 4 Obkom, op. 5 1927, d. 34 Perepiska s Tsentral’nym Komitetom o bor’be s
oppozitsiei, l. 64.




 and the Secretariat,
were not helpful in this regard. 
24. TsDOO SO, f. 4 Obkom, op. 5 1927, d. 34 Perepiska s Tsentral’nym komitetom o bor’be s
oppozitsiei, l. 55. 
 
















 trade union councils” by




 executive committee, and two








 level commission on









 In the months that followed, attacks on
directors and technical specialists increased. There were no arrests or accusations
of “counter-revolutionary activity,” but acts of intimidation were common.








 leaders commonly accused factory officials of resisting directives




The tide had yet to turn entirely against the directors and technical specialists.




 and the centre there were those who believed that repression
would only make targets harder to achieve. It was ultimately Stalin who, in early
1928, broke the tensions between those who promoted a hard and soft line. Some




describing an alleged criminal conspiracy of old specialists in the coal industry of
the Donets basin (Donbass) to disrupt the Soviet fuel supply on behalf of foreign




 and discussed with
members of the OGPU (Ianson and Menzhinskii), a top-level delegation was sent to
the Donbass to “make recommendations for practical measures that can form the








 The primary recommendation of
the Commission is well known: the organisation of a show trial–the Shakhty trial.
At the beginning of April, a Central Committee plenum met to discuss the
Shakhty affair. The plenum showed the continuing division of opinion on economic
policy. In a speech introducing the issue, A. I. Rykov observed that “since the
conspiracy was uncovered, some party comrades have thought that the affair was
blown out of proportion.” Rykov insisted that, as the investigation proceeded, it
was becoming clear that the seriousness of the conspiracy was, if anything, initially
underestimated. Some subsequent speakers, including A. A. Zhdanov of Nizhnii
Novgorod and A. A. Andreev of the North Caucasus, enthusiastically agreed that




Other delegates, including K. V. Sukhomlin of Ukraine and M. Oshvintsev of the
Urals, warned about the dangers of whipping up hostility to managers. Sukhomlin
 
25. TsDOO SO, f. 4 Obkom, op. 5 1927, d. 10 Protokoly biuro Obkoma, ll. 9, 53, 107-109, 339,




 party committees for their
failure to ensure reductions in production costs.
26. See for example Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sverdlovskoi Oblasti (GASO), f. 94-r
Uralmet, op. 4 1926, d. 9 Perepiska predsedatelia Pravleniia Uralmeta s Glavmetallom i
promyshlennymi predpriiatiiami o finansirovanii i stroitel’stve zavodov, ll. 3, 10, 13, 20, 38,
54, 80-87, 109, 112-116.
27. RGASPI, f. 17 Tsentral’nyi komitet, op. 3 Protokoly Politbiuro, d. 676 Protokol #14,
7 marta 1928, l. 22 Ob ekonomicheskoi kontrrevoliutsii v iuzhnykh raionakh ugol’noi











suggested that creating a political campaign on the Shakhty issue could “bring




 Oshvintsev agreed, explaining that many managers
were already so frightened that they spent much of their time getting written




The Plenum ended in a stalemate between the advocates of repressive action
against old specialists and non-party managers and those who sought to prevent a
campaign against them. Despite Stalin’s open advocacy of a “class struggle” of old




 the resolutions of the Plenum showed clear evidence





neither afforded protection for managers and specialists, nor signalled an attack.
Party leaders in the regions were essentially free to proceed as they saw fit.
Consequently, existing tensions went unresolved.
In the Urals, conflict over the tempo of industrialisation intensified in the course
of 1928. The need for dramatic action was apparent. It was generally perceived that
the majority of new investment was going to Ukraine. An article in the VSNKh
newspaper had observed that with projected investment of over 100 million rubles
in the Southern Steel Trust, Ukraine could significantly expand production, but that
projected investment of 50 million rubles in the Urals might not even prevent




 Urals leaders increasingly felt the
necessity to show that regional industry could provide a higher rate of return in
order to avoid losing projects to Ukraine and other regions. They had hesitated to
pressure local managers and planners to revise their plans, but as Ukrainian
industry advanced, the mood began to change.
In the fall of 1928, in connection with an investigation of wrecking in the gold










chairman I. D. Kabakov, among others in the Urals leadership, made much of the
 
29. RGASPI, f. 17 Tsentral’nyi komitet, op. 2 Plenumy, d. 344 Stenogramma Plenuma TsK i






31. RGASPI, f. 17 Tsentral’nyi komitet, op. 2 Plenumy, d. 347 Stenogramma Plenuma TsK i
TsKK, 6-11 aprelia 1928, t. 4, ll. 34-35. Stalin was effusive in his praise of Andreev’s “truly
revolutionary speech.” He insisted that “we must arm new specialists in such a way that they
will be certainly victorious in a struggle with old specialists.”









 (July 7, 1928).
34. Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Administrativnykh Organov Sverdlovskoi Oblasti (GAAO SO),
f. 1, op. 2 Lichnye dela, d. K-12238 O kontr-revoliutsionnoi vreditel’skoi organizatsii v zoloto-
platinovoi promyshlennosti SSSR. All files from GAAO SO (the regional FSB archive) consist
of transcripts of interrogations. Such a source must be approached with extreme caution. Given
the brutality of secret police methods and the propensity to demand confessions to imaginary
crimes, the initial impulse of the researcher is to assume that the transcripts represent the ideas
of the interrogators rather than the interrogated. However, judging from a broad cross section of
files, from the mid-1920s through the Great Terror, this seems to be much less true of
interrogations that open a given investigation. For example, at the outset of the Uralplatina
 




discovery–which came to be known as the “Uralplatina affair.” At the November
1928 Central Committee plenum, Kabakov announced that documents found on
local specialists–geologists–showed they had long hidden reserves not only of gold




 The Urals State Geological Surveying
Administration (
 
Ural’skoe Gosudarstvennoe Geologorazvedochnoe Upravlenie
 
 –





geologists were told to find new reserves of metals, ores and especially cokeable
coal in an extremely short period. Significant proven deposits had the potential to
substantially reduce the cost of metal production by reducing–or eliminating–the
need to import coal from Siberia. Senior geologists scoffed at the demands. M. S.
Volkov, the technical director of UGGRU later described his senior colleagues as
scholars with their own research agendas, unhappy being compelled to serve the
immediate needs of industry. They were most offended by the demands for
immediate results. They knew that surveying the requested areas would require
much more financing, cadres, and time, than they were given. They were quick to








 was equally quick to
respond. It replaced the administration of UGGRU with party members, and
encouraged the Soviet-trained geologists to criticise their bosses. Shortly
thereafter, the new UGGRU administration removed senior geologist D. F.
Murashev for submitting an article to the press suggesting that Urals copper
reserves were “exaggerated.” Administration officials accused him of “attempting




 had made it clear that giant new “finds” would be rewarded. Anything else
would be viewed as an attempt to “reduce the Urals to the status of a second-rate




 The Uralplatina affair was a turning point. In one
sense, the regions were promoting Stalin’s line on class struggle. In another, they
were deceiving Moscow about the real state of the local economy.
The “Uralplatina affair” was the most important, but not the only case used by




 to put upward pressure on regional plans. In the fall,
incidents of open resistance to tempos were the subjects of trials in many of the
 
35. RGASPI, f. 17 Tsentral’nyi komitet, op. 2 Plenumy, d. 385 Stenogramma plenuma
Tsentral’nogo Komiteta, 16-24 noiabria 1928, t. 4, ll. 144-145.
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investigation, OGPU interrogators asked relatively open-ended questions. Responses were
plausible in commonsense terms and the events they described can often be verified against
other credible sources. Those interrogated were not under pressure to confess to fantastic
charges such as spying for foreign governments or plotting the assassination of Soviet leaders,
at least not until the summer of 1937. Of course, even the early investigations featured forced
confessions. The transcripts generally begin with an initial denial of “membership in an
underground Trotskyist organisation” and proceed days or weeks later to a confession of just
that. Once that “confession” had been made, Trotskyism became a vague label, a frame for the
description of concrete events and actions: the underfunding of geological surveys, the masking
of poor results and so on. It was not until interrogators were well into an investigation that they










Many of those who opposed existing efficiency targets or disputed the realism of
targets for industrial growth were intimidated into silence. V. P. Krapivin, the
technical director of the Urals Metallurgical Trust, promoted the plans of the Trust
before central organs despite his firm conviction that the construction schedules




The aftershocks of the Shakhty affair appear to have had the same effect
throughout the Soviet Union. M. A. Solovov, a prominent figure in the Urals
Planning Commission, later recounted how he had “felt the general lack of faith in












 member N. Bukharin published his




, warning of the potential dangers to economic




 Meanwhile, in the regions, there was
a sense of desperation about the control figures. The figures for 1928-1929 were to
constitute the first year of the five-year plan. Failure to establish a favourable
relative share of investment in the 1928-1929 figures could undermine a region’s
ambitions for a much longer period. Thus, tensions in the regions were also driven
to a head.
By mid-October, probably on Stalin’s initiative, the press began to print articles





 chairman A. I. Rykov attempted to smooth over
differences of opinion in his speech opening the plenum. He admitted that the
control figures had left a “huge mass of unsatisfied demands,” but he argued against
“creating a fetish for tempos” — the economy could not sustain a consistent growth
of tempos, or even the maintenance of the existing rates of growth.42 Nevertheless,
many delegates both from the regions and the centre insisted on both higher tempos
and a much harder line on the “Right danger.” They took the podium with criticism
of inadequate funding for projects under their jurisdiction: tempos had to be raised,
and those who opposed them removed from the party.43 At the subsequent XVI
Party Conference (April 1929), regional delegates specifically linked cuts to
proposed projects with the leaders of the “Right opposition.” N. B. Riazanov of the
Institute of Marx and Engels joked that “every speaker ends his presentation with
"Give us a factory in the Urals and to hell with the Right!" "Build us a power station
38. Ural’skii rabochii (September 1, October 23, 1928).
39. GAAO SO, f. 1, op. 2 Lichnye dela, d. 7504 Delo Solovova, Mikhaila Aleksandrovicha, ll.
66-67.
40. Ibid., ll. 19-20.
41. Pravda (September 30, 1928).
42. RGASPI, f. 17 Tsentral’nyi komitet, op. 2 Plenumy, d. 377 Stenogramma plenuma
Tsentral’nogo komiteta, 16-24 noiabria 1928, ll. 23-24, 63-64.
43. RGASPI, f. 17 Tsentral’nyi komitet, op. 2 Plenumy, d. 381 Stenogramma plenuma
Tsentral’nogo komiteta, 16-24 noiabria 1928. See for example the speeches of R. I. Eikhe
(Siberia) ch. 1, l. 15; F. I. Goloshcheikin (Kazakhstan) ch. 1, ll. 25-26; V. Ia. Chubar’ (Ukraine)
ch. 2, l. 54; S. I. Syrtsov (Siberia) ch. 2, l. 128; M. M. Khataevich (Middle Volga) ch. 2, l. 148.
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and to hell with the Right!"”44 Regional leaders not only accepted Stalin’s
campaign against the Right, they encouraged it.
During the campaign, many regional party and economic officials still refused
to accept cuts to their plans. When a new proposal was rejected, or financing to an
existing project reduced, these officials commonly sought to overturn the decision
by accusing its authors of “disorganising” the economy. In the spring of 1929,
funding for the construction of the Uralmash plant was cut from 6.5 million to
2 million rubles, and then in May instructions were received by telegram from
Glavmetall to suspend construction altogether. Upon receipt of the telegram, a
meeting of the Uralmash party cell was convened. It resolved to “declare the
instructions of Glavmetall incorrect and achieve their reversal.”45 The director of
Uralmash, A. P. Bannikov, then headed to Moscow. He denounced the Glavmetall
instructions in his meetings with party leaders, members of the VSNKh Presidium
and the chairman of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate S. Ordzhonikidze.46
According to S. A. Khrennikov, a member of the Collegium of Glavmetall, regional
officials frequently presented exaggerated, excessively expensive, incomplete and
unworkable plans to central organs and leapt to accusations of “wrecking and
sabotage” if the plans were rejected.47 Beginning in the summer of 1929, the OGPU
led a wave of arrests of economic officials accused of “wrecking.” In the process of
its “investigations,” it received masses of denunciations of central officials from the
regions.48 In this way, the work of the regional OGPU contributed directly to
Stalin’s victory over the Right Opposition, and the last obstacle to the assumption
of uncontested personal power, but not all of the work of the Urals political police
would have won Stalin’s personal approval. The regional leadership was also using
the local OGPU to mislead the centre and to manipulate central policy in its favour.
In the competition for the first five-year plan investment, the lack of local
supplies of cokeable coal had been the single gravest argument against the
development of the Urals as a metals and machine building centre. The importation
of coke from the Kuznetsk basin in Western Siberia pleased neither Moscow nor
the Urals given the high cost of transportation. Coking experiments on Urals coal
had been conducted throughout the 1920s without producing clear results. By the
late 1920s, when the Urals version of the first five-year plan was under
44. Shestnadtsataia konferentsiia Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bol’shevikov).
Stenograficheskii otchet, 23-29 aprelia 1929 g. (Moscow, 1929): 102.
45. A.I. Busygin, Pervyi direktor (Sverdlovsk, Sredne-ural’skoe knizhnoe izd., 1977): 64;
G.A. Unpelev, Rozhdenie Uralmasha, 1928-1933 gg. (Moscow, Izd. sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi
literatury, 1960): 24.
46. A.I Busygin, op. cit.: 66.
47. Material k otchetu TsKK VKP(b) XVI s’’ezdu VKP(b), sostavlennyi OGPU (k dokladu
tov. Ordzhonikidze) (Moscow, 1930): 50, 53.
48. GAAO SO, f. 1, op. 2 Lichnye dela, d. 43927 Delo Dunaeva, Borisa Sergeevicha (member
of the Presidium of the Urals Oblsovnarkhoz), l. 157; d. 43927 Delo Girbasova, Petra
Afanas’eva (technical director of the Urals Mining Trust), ll. 136-137; d. 7504 Delo
Gassel’blata, Vitaliia Alekseevicha (technical director of Magnitostroi), l. 32; G.A. Unpelev,
op. cit.: 24-26.
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consideration in central economic organs, regional party leaders exerted intense
pressure on local geologists and metallurgists to produce favourable results. Urals
leaders were concerned that new investment in coal production would go to the
Moscow or Don basins.49 The pressure resulted in a split between senior specialists
trained before the revolution and the new cadre of Soviet-trained specialists.50 The
former resisted the pressure and the latter took the opportunity to discredit their
bosses by exaggerating the success of their experiments.51 In the summer of 1930,
I. D. Kabakov, now oblast’ party first secretary, wrote in a letter to the head of the
Urals Coal Trust:
“The issue [of the coking of Urals coal] is not looking good. Not in the sense that
Kizel [a Urals coal basin] coke can’t be used for metal production, but rather in
the sense that people out there have tried to discredit (kakaia-to ruka sdelala vse
dlia togo, chtoby diskreditirovat’) the coking of Kizel coal. The issue is being
investigated, and at the present stage it’s clearly a criminal affair (prestuplenie
na litso). In all probability it’s the work of specialists–of course those hostilely
oriented towards us. It’s better not to raise a fuss. We’ll finish the investigation
and everything will be clear. We can hope to extricate ourselves (ob etom dele
vykruchivat’sia) and not permit the discreditation of Kizel coke.”52
Within a couple of months, a group of Urals metallurgists and geologists were
arrested and charged with “criminally delaying the development” of the regional
coal industry.53 The affair was kept sufficiently quiet such that Moscow never saw
fit to question the results of the coking experiments. In the next five years, hundreds
of millions of rubles were spent developing mines in the Kizel basin and building
coking plants–though Kizel coal never was cokeable.54
A similar scenario was played out in the Urals copper industry in 1931 when
local officials were preparing the first version of the regional second five-year plan.
Huge copper reserves were being discovered in Kazakhstan,55 and Urals officials
49. GAAO SO, f. 1, op. 2 Lichnye dela, d. 43927 Delo Girbasova, Petra Afanas’evicha, ll. 136-
137.
50. GAAO SO, f. 1, op. 2 Lichnye dela, d. 43927 Delo Volkova, Mikhaila Semenovicha, ll. 62-
64. The transcripts of the interrogations of Volkov, Girbasov and others are included in the
same delo.
51. The process follows a pattern distinctly similar to that of other professions. See for example
Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Cultural revolution as class war,” Susan Gross Solomon, “Rural scholars
and the cultural revolution,” and George M. Enteen, “Marxist historians during the cultural
revolution: A case study of professional in-fighting,” in Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Cultural
revolution in Russia, 1928-1931 (Bloomington, 1978).
52. TsDOO SO, f. 4 Obkom, op. 8 1930, d. 102 Spravki, protokoly rassledovaniia organov
OGPU po Uralu, raikomov i gorkomov VKP(b) o faktakh klassovoi bor’by i vreditel’stva na
predpriatiiakh oblasti, l. 54. One can assume that Shakhgil’dian, the head of the Urals Coal
Trust, was a party to this affair. He and Kabakov were reputed to be very close friends until they
were both arrested in 1937. GAAO SO, f. 1, op. 2 Lichnye dela, d. 22861 Delo Sedasheva, l. 39;
d. 17368 Delo Kabakova, Ivana Dmitrievicha, l. 75.
53. Ibid., d. 43927 Delo Volkova; d. 43935 Delo Anitova, Sergeia Ivanovicha. 
54. To this day, despite steady advances in coking technology, neither Kizel coal, nor any other
Urals coal is considered efficiently cokeable.
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were determined not to lose investment capital to their southern neighbour. Copper
production was crucial to the production of alloys, construction materials and
machine building and it promised the development of subsidiary chemical
production based on by-products. The Urals was hoping for over a billion rubles of
investment in its non-ferrous metals industry in the second five-year plan.56 Rather
than admit that the regional geological surveying administration still had no clear
data on ore reserves, local leaders directed the OGPU to pressure the administration
to fake firm conclusions in a presentation to the government.57 Construction was
approved (though not the full billion rubles requested) and when the plants were
completed, the ores proved neither to be of the quantity nor of the quality promised
in the plan.58 Now the pattern of deception was confirmed. In the early 1930s the
OGPU was dually subordinated only in theory. In practice, it served the regional
party and promoted its interests at the expense of those of the centre. The pattern
only deepened in the following few years.
OGPU/NKVD and blameshifting
The fantastic ambitions of the first five-year plan drove the economy into a state of
chaos. Almost no plan targets were fulfilled and the centre and regions bickered
about who was at fault. Nevertheless, when by 1931 the attention of planning
organs shifted to the second five-year plan, regional organs once again proposed
vast programs of investment and construction.59 But this time, the centre refused to
accept them. Three times the general plan was revised, each time reducing
projected targets. Even more disturbing to the regions was the fact that these
reduced targets would be enforced. No excuses would be accepted for anything less
than 100% fulfilment.
A more “moderate” plan was hardly of any solace to the regions. Targets for
construction and production were reduced, but projected financing was reduced
even further. Calls for “iron discipline before the budget of the proletarian
55. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki (RGAE), f. 4372 Gosplan SSSR, op. 31
1933, d. 784 Stenogramma Vsesoiuznoi konferentsii po razmeshcheniiu proizvoditel’nykh sil v
UKK [Uralo-Kuznetskii Kombinat], 7-11 aprelia 1932, l. 25.
56. RGAE, f.8034 Glavtsvetmet, op. 1, d. 453 Piatiletnii plan razvitiia tsvetnoi i zoloto-
platinovoi promyshlennosti na Urale na 1933-1937 gg., ll. 170-181. The billion ruble figure
excluded the costs of geological research and construction in the gold and platinum industries.
57. GAAO SO, f. 1, op. 2 Lichnye dela, d. 22861 Delo Sedasheva, l. 33.
58. Materials were also faked in the justification of the Sinara pipe factory project. Here too
production could not physically meet plan targets because of the lack of ores. Ibid., d. 22329
Delo Davydova, Andreia Aleksandrovicha, l. 5.
59. For a statement of the Urals ambitions for the second five-year-plan, see GASO, f. 241-r
Oblplan, op. 1 Sektsiia promyshlennaia, d.827 Perspektivnyi plan UKK (Ural’skoi chasti) na
1931-1937, ll. 33-35. Gosplan criticised the Urals region for pushing “fantastical tempos”,
RGAE, f. 4372 Gosplan, op. 30 1932, d. 784 Pervaia konferentsiia po razmeshcheniiu
proizvoditel’nykh sil v UKK, l. 3.
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state”60 contrasted sharply with the free spending of the first five-year plan. But the
most serious problem was rooted in the region’s first five-year plan. Many of the
key projects were dependent on the supplies of coal and ores that, as regional
officials knew well, simply did not exist. As new plants were completed and were
to account for an ever larger share of production, as ever greater efficiency was
demanded of them, the plan became progressively more difficult to fulfil. Urals
officials knew they were in trouble, that plan targets could not be fulfilled.
They responded by developing strategies of self-protection. Most important of
these was the careful control of Moscow’s access to information on the state of the
regional economy. Similarly, they cultivated an image of themselves as
aggressively active in their loyalty to the central leadership and the “Central
Committee line” while at the same time trying to reduce plan responsibilities and
simplify tasks. A slush fund was run out of the economic administration of the
Oblast’ Executive Committee which ensured that key members of the regional
leadership would have a substantial income, a large apartment, a government car, a
country home and so on.61 Their professional reputations were systematically
promoted at state and party meetings, in public fora and in the press. According to
Kabakov, all key positions in the oblast’ were under the control of the clique by
1935.62 This even included the local representative of the NKVD, Reshetov, who
was very much in the inner circle of the clique, and a close personal friend of
Kabakov.63 
“What resulted was a "wall" which not even the most determined and brave
could break through. In addition to which, the combined authority of the leading
oblast’ organs under our control had been driven so deeply into the minds of the
broad party masses, that it was impossible to expect that anyone would attempt
to aggregate and draw conclusions from scattered evidence of wrong-doing and
criminal activity [...]. This would mean casting suspicion on all elements of the
party, state and economic leadership of the oblast’.”64
This state of affairs in which any attempt to criticise or discredit the leadership was
likely to draw an overwhelming counterattack gave the members of the clique the
confidence to believe that they were “untouchable.”65
Scapegoating was a key tactic of self-protection, and one in which the local
NKVD played a central role. In cases of local scandals or problems of plan
60. RGASPI, f. 17 Tsentral’nyi komitet, op. 2 Plenumy, d. 514 Ob’’edinennyi plenum TsK i
TsKK VKP(b), 7-12 ianvaria 1933, l. 93.
61. GAAO SO, f. 1, op. 2 Lichnye dela, d. 17368 Delo Kabakova, Ivana Dmitrievicha, l. 68; d.
22861, Delo Sedasheva, ll. 63-64, 174.
62. Ibid., d. 17368 Delo Kabakova, ll. 50-51.
63. The NKVD shared with members of the clique materials it received which could have
proved dangerous to its members. Ibid., d. 22861 Delo Sedasheva, ll. 36-37; d. 17368 Delo
Kabakova, l. 64. 
64. Ibid., d. 17368 Delo Kabakova, l. 64.
65. Kabakov used the term. Ibid., l. 69.
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fulfilment which caught the attention of Moscow, the regional leadership
conveniently found an “enemy of the people,” often a former oppositionist or some
other vulnerable official to take the blame. The idea of internal enemies of the
regime that appears to have excited Stalin’s mind was by no means discouraged in
the regions. On the contrary, Sverdlovsk oblast’ and several other regions
developed a reputation for holding large numbers of show trials. In 1936, the
Commission for Party Control singled out Sverdlovsk and Saratov oblasti for
having “completely baselessly arrested and convicted people and undertaken mass
repression for minor problems.”66
For the factory director who was not given the option of explaining to his
superiors why and how the plan was unrealistic, it was all too easy to find
scapegoats, in the guise of “saboteurs” and “counter-revolutionaries,” who could
take the fall for underfulfilment: construction engineers for faulty work, warehouse
directors for the spoilage of inputs, railroad workers for shortages in supply.
Similar tactics were employed throughout the oblast’ apparatus up to and including
the Obkom bureau. For example, the Sverdlovsk Obkom had showed little
enthusiasm for the Stakhanovite movement given that it raised production targets
and increased administrative tasks without providing clear local benefits. But when
the inaction came to the attention of the Politbiuro, and a purge of Obkom
department heads was threatened, the Obkom bureau directed the regional legal
organs to find cases of “sabotage and resistance” of Stakhanovism in the factory. In
the spring of 1936, within Sverdlovsk oblast’ there were 236 trials relating to
accusations of wrecking in the Stakhanovite movement.67 While the Sverdlovsk
leadership claimed to be a “solid, monolithic, reliable pillar of the Stalinist Central
Committee,” it worked with the local NKVD to deflect the pressures of the plan and
of campaign politics.
The centre was not aware of the tactics employed by the regional leaders, but it
did know that many of its directives were being resisted. In early 1934, Sergo
Ordzhonikidze observed that “when we issue directives, we are uncertain whether
they will be implemented.”68 Determined to put an end to such a situation, the
central leadership created a new set of control organs to check on the fulfilment of
decisions. In his speech announcing the establishment of the Commissions for
Party and Soviet Control (Komissiia Partiinogo Kontrolia–KPK, Komissiia
Sovetskogo Kontrolia–KSK), Stalin made it clear that these organs would be
empowered to remove “any responsible official, including officials of the Central
Committee” who refused to promptly implement central directives, or as Stalin put
it, to remove “officials with well-known services in the past [...] who think that
66. Tsentral’noe Khranenie Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), f. 6 KPK, op. 1 Protokoly,
d. 59 Zasedanii biuro, 29 fevralia-3 marta 1936, ll. 184-186.
67. TsKhSD, f. 6, op. 1, d. 59, ll. 184-186.
68. The quotation is of Sergo Ordzhonikidze from early 1934. RGAE, f. 7297 NKTP, op. 38
Sekretariat, d. 104 Stenogramma vystupleniia t. S. Ordzhonikidze na zakrytom partiinom
sobranii sotrudnikov NKTP SSSR ob itogakh raboty XVII s’’ezda VKP(b), l. 1.
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party and Soviet laws were written not for them, but for idiots.”69 The tide was
turning against the regional clique, though it was not yet entirely clear. The threat to
remove top officials followed in the aftermath of the disastrous grain collections
campaigns of the previous two years in which many local officials had shown a lack
of enthusiasm for central targets in the face of widespread famine. But when the
Commissions were created, the worst of the famine was over and industrial
production was beginning to surge forward. Moscow was less certain about
attacking high officials once things had started to improve.
It was not the control organs that undermined the clique in the end, but rather the
regional clique’s own tactic of scapegoating. The situation in the region was
unstable. As production targets increased, it became more difficult to fulfil the plan
and hide problems. Industrial accidents were common. Often, ill-trained workers
damaged new and expensive equipment. Incomplete or low quality production was
frequently shipped despite prohibitions. 1936 was a particularly difficult year.
After three years of tolerating unplanned expenditures within industry, the centre
imposed tough cost-cutting measures to deal with inter-enterprise debt. As well, the
disastrous 1936 harvest put further strain on the economy.70 The increasingly
desperate state of plan fulfilment accelerated the propensity to scapegoat. In
response to the doubling of the accident rate in the Urals non-ferrous metals
industry since 1935, Glavtsvetmet recommended educational measures for workers
and engineers, but a local trust director insisted that only show trials would reduce
the number of accidents.71
Cracks had begun to develop within the leadership group itself. The directors of
mining enterprises resented the regional machine-builders for the shortage of
mining equipment. Directors of the machine-building trusts were upset that they
weren’t getting the metals they needed. Similarly, the directors of the metal works
were angry at the mining enterprises for not supplying them with enough fuels and
ores. Meanwhile, state and party leaders were not happy with the directors. The
regional leadership was a tinderbox of tensions to which the centre set a spark in the
summer of 1936 with the trial of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. Associated with the
trial was a central campaign designed to rout the “last remnants of the Trotskyist-
Zinovievite band.” It uncovered far more “enemies” than anyone expected. The
campaign provoked a firestorm of denunciations beyond the ability of the regional
leadership to control. After the trial of the Trotskyist-Zinovievite bloc, tensions
within the factory exploded as various groups accused others of “oppositionist
activity” by way of assessing blame for poor economic performance. Workers
denounced Stakhanovites; Stakhanovites denounced engineers and technical
69. XVII s’’ezd Vsesouznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bol’shevikov). Stenograficheskii
otchet (Moscow, Profizdat, 1934): 34-35.
70. Roberta Manning, “The Soviet economic crisis of 1936-1940 and the Great Purges,”
Stalinist terror: New perspectives (Cambridge, 1993): 129-33.
71. RGAE, f. 8034 Glavtsvetmet, op. 1, d. 938 Stenogramma soveshchaniia aktiva trestov
“Uraltsvetmet” i “Uralmed’ruda” po voprosam okhrany truda i tekhniki bezopasnosti na
predpriiatiiakh trestov, 10 oktiabria 1936 g., l. 7.
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specialists. District and factory party committees traded accusations that the other
was protecting counter-revolutionaries.
Any hopes Kabakov had had for restraining the progress of mutual
denunciations vanished in September, when the regional NKVD representative
Reshetov was replaced:
“[After the arrival of the new representative, Dmitriev,] the situation changed
radically. The ground under our feet got so hot [sic], that I immediately unders-
tood that the unmasking of my colleagues and me was only a matter of time.”72
Kabakov was probably trying to flatter his interrogators, but he did have reason to be
worried in September. Reshetov had been his friend and ally. He and others had relied
on Reshetov to share information and to protect the clique.73 Dmitriev was not likely
to do the same. According to K. G. Sedashev, the Eastern Steel Trust chairman,
Kabakov was “horribly disturbed” by Reshetov’s removal.74 Fears about Dmitriev
were quickly realised. It proved to be impossible to stop his investigations. By the end
of May 1937, the almost entire Obkom leadership had been arrested.
Terror and after
Had Stalin and the central leadership been aware that many regional party organs
had controlled the local OGPU/NKVD? It is hard to say, but at the time they created
the KPK and KSK to check on the fulfilment of decisions (1934), they had also
started to centralise control over the local NKVD. Since their inception, the local
political police had been selected by regional organisations on the approval of the
central organs. In connection with the formation of the NKVD in 1934, for the first
time the central NKVD was to control appointments to highest ranks in the
regions.75 If this was an attempt to break regional party control, it was not very
successful. In Sverdlovsk oblast’, nothing changed. Reshetov remained in his
favoured place within the Obkom clique, and the same seems to have applied with
the NKVD chiefs in many other regions.76
This changed suddenly, in the autumn of 1936. After he took the reins of the
NKVD, Ezhov initiated a purge of the regional political police.77 In Sverdlovsk
72. GAAO SO, f. 1, op. 2 Lichnye dela, d. 17368 Delo Kabakova, t. 1, l. 59.
73. Ibid., d. 22861 Delo Sedasheva, ll. 36-37.
74. Ibid., l. 37. 
75. A. I. Kokurin and N. V. Petrov, Lubianka: VChK-OGPU-NKVD-MGB-MVD-KGB,
1917-1960. Spravochnik (Moscow, 1997): 167, 192.
76. J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The road to terror: Stalin and the self-destruction of the
Bolsheviks, 1932-1939 (New Haven, 1999): 266.
77. The dimensions and targets of the purge remain something of a mystery. Shortly before his
execution, Ezhov claimed to have purged 14,000 but he does not specify who and over what
period of time. Ibid.: 562.
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oblast’, Dmitriev’s investigations quickly uncovered the great scale of collusion
between the regional party and NKVD in the subversion of central directives. It
would not be surprising if a very large proportion of regional political police had
been purged (and arrested), and it was unlikely indeed that the centre would allow
such collusion to re-emerge. In May 1939, a directive of the All-Union NKVD
formalised a new administrative order in which all appointments to the local
political police were controlled from the centre. Control over the fulfilment of
NKVD decisions was to be checked by a new NKVD Secretariat.78
On the heels of the arrest and execution of the previous two Obkom first
secretaries, the Sverdlovsk regional leadership was desperate to set a distance
between itself and its predecessors. When faced with evidence of underfulfilment,
the new first secretary V. M. Andrianov told his department heads and enterprise
directors to “work twenty-four hours a day” if they had to, “but fulfil the directives
of the Central Committee completely and unconditionally”.79 At the same time, the
regional leadership was at pains to explain the shift in tasks from the “struggle
against wrecking” to the “struggle against the consequences of wrecking.” In their
speeches, the “consequences of wrecking” referred to the coping mechanisms of
their predecessors. Passing incomplete or faulty production, cutting corners on
production safety and other coping mechanisms had facilitated an impression of
plan fulfilment while making stable advances in production more difficult. At an
Obkom plenum in late 1939, directors and department were told not to look for
wreckers, but to take more responsibility for the state of affairs where they worked.
The message met with resistance. It was no easier to meet the plan now than it had
been in the mid-1930s, and they still needed to cut corners. Accidents, breakdowns
and other “suspicious” events were still very common. The spectre of wrecking still
presented an invaluable opportunity to pass the blame for problems of production.
At party and state meetings, factory directors and local party officials continued to
assess accidents and breakdowns as the work of wreckers and saboteurs.80
Did they believe in an immanent threat from wreckers? One local assistant
plenipotentiary of the NKVD wrote to Beriia asking for clarification. On the one
hand, he wrote, his bosses continued baselessly to arrest innocent people. On the
other hand, many others “on whom there was weighty compromising material”
were being set free.81 No clarification was forthcoming. The centre discouraged
mass arrests, but it continued to demand vigilance against wreckers, spies and
78. A.I.Kokurin and N.V. Petrov, op. cit.: 235-236.
79. TsDOO SO, f. 4, op. 34 1939, d. 9 Stenogramma XI plenuma Sverdlovskogo oblastnogo
komiteta VKP(b), 29 noiabria-2 dekabria 1939 g., ll. 249-250.
80. TsDOO SO, f. 4, op. 33 1938, d. 19 Stenogramma III plenuma Sverdlovskogo oblastnogo
komiteta VKP(b), 15-18 dekabria 1938 g., ll. 30, 34; op. 34 1939, d. 151 Stenogrammy
soveshchanii rabotnikov apparata obkoma, zaveduiushchikh otdelami, sekretarei gorkomov i
raikomov partii po voprosu o perestroike partiinogo apparata, ll. 30-31.
81. TsDOO SO, f. 4, op. 35 1940, d. 300 Dokladnye zapiski, spravki o rabote s kadrami v
oblastnoi prokurature, ob itogakh i nedostatkakh v rabote sudebno-prokuraturskikh organov i
rukovoditelei predpriiatii po vypolneniiu ukaza Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ot 26 iiulia 1940,
ll. 47-51.
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saboteurs. While regional officials were responsible for total plan fulfilment in the
absence of any input to the plan, or flexibility in the means by which they met plan
targets, they continued to evade central directives and to scapegoat others for
shortcomings in production.82
Such strategies fooled the centre for some time in the 1930s. They did not fool
anyone now — not merely because Moscow was better equipped to detect them,
but also because the oblast’ level party “clique” did not have the same power to
dominate politics in the region. The party was much larger now, with many more
positions of independent authority. Officials were better educated and much less
inclined to be in awe of the Obkom secretary and his membership on the Central
Committee. And the local representative of the NKVD/MGB/MVD could no
longer be relied upon to enforce the will of the regional party leaders. In place of a
single, dominant, regional “clique,” or “family group” to provide patronage and
protection, local officials were more likely to be a part of smaller, city, district or
factory level “cliques” which managed their self-presentation to the outside world.
Loyalties were much less clear. The political police at all levels found it difficult to
work without some co-operation with corresponding party organs and some found
a certain level of mutual back-scratching advantageous. There was, however, no
dominant oblast’ level clique to keep a lid on local tensions, and the stronger,
“vertical” checks on the fulfilment of decisions made those “horizontal” back-
scratching relationships terribly unreliable.
All this made regional politics more tense and conflictual than they had been in
the 1930s. When production problems deepened to the point where masking
problems was impossible, there was no group that could prevent or control the
process of scapegoating. For example, when the Uralmash plant was unable to hide
serious plan underfulfilment in 1949, the Industry and Transport Department of the
Sverdlovsk City Committee together with the local representatives of the MGB
revealed the “anti-state practice of plan falsification” (pripiski k planu) at the
factory.83 In that way, they would not have to answer for the mess. Similarly, when
the regional coal industry was criticised from Moscow, the oblast’ leadership
accused the party secretaries of the coal producing districts of suppressing local
criticism and hiding production problems from them.84
82. Local party leaders and enterprise directors continued to lie about the state of plan
fulfilment. Reports on plan fulfilment almost invariably were set in ruble terms, which hid
creative adjustments to the nomenclature of production and took advantage of inflation.
Demands for inputs were exaggerated, and unused plant capacities went unmentioned.
Overfulfilment in any given month was unreported and applied against subsequent shortfalls.
See Joseph Berliner, Factory and manager in the USSR (Cambridge, Mass., 1957).
83. TsDOO SO, f. 4, op. 45 1949, d. 196 Dokladnye zapiski, spravki partiinykh rabotnikov,
rukovoditelei khoziaistvennykh organisatsii v obkom partii o sostoianii i rabote predpriiatii
tiazheloi i mashinostroitel’noi promyshlennosti oblasti, ianvar’-sentiabr’ 1949 g., ll. 47-56.
84. TsDOO SO, f. 4, op. 45 1949, d. 211 Spravki, informatsii rabotnikov obkoma, gorkomov,
raikomov VKP(b) v obkom partii o rasmotrenii zhalob i zaiavlenii na nepravil’nye deistviia
rukovoditelei, zazhime kritiki, aprel’-oktiabr’ 1949, ll. 26-29, 43-45.
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The regular conflicts between the Obkom, on the one hand, and the district and
city party committees, on the other, were particularly severe and consequential. In
his tenure as Obkom first secretary (1946-1952), Viktor Nedosekin never managed
to create the impression of plan fulfilment. While his reports to Moscow spoke of
the great advances of Urals industry, there were other sources of information
painting a far less flattering picture.85 In 1948, Nedosekin was hauled into the
Orgbiuro and told that if he failed to turn things around he would be removed.86 In
turn, he tried to lay the blame for problems on the district and city party committees
and had them removed en masse. The annual rate of turnover of district and city
party secretaries often exceeded 50%.87 Like Andrianov before him, he had a
reputation for destroying the careers of those who crossed him.88 And yet,
Nedosekin succeeded only in building the ire of the local secretaries, who in turn
relentlessly criticised the Obkom before central officials for failing to give them
appropriate assistance. In the summer of 1951, the Central Committee apparatus
began to transfer Obkom secretaries out of the oblast’. By September all mention of
Nedosekin disappears from the local archives, though his replacement was named
only in September of 1952.
On the eve of Stalin’s death, there were signs that scapegoating might lead to a
new wave of terror against the regions. Many of the sorts of corruption and abuses
of power revealed in the Mingrelian affair were common to all the regions.89
Certainly, Moscow was losing patience with regional organisations for misleading
them about plan fulfilment and relying on “family groups” to protect their local
authority.90 The new party statutes passed at the XIX Party Congress made it clear
that “hiding and perverting the truth from the party [...] was incompatible with
membership in its ranks” as was anything less than the “active struggle for the
fulfilment of party decisions.”91 More seriously, a decree of the Council of
Ministers earlier in the year had increased the punishment for some categories of
85. The sources include district and city party committees, regional plenipotentiaries and the
ministries. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 134 Otdel tiazheloi promyshlennosti TsK VKP(b), d. 8 Proekty
postanovlenii Sovmina SSSR, podgotovlennye Sverdlovskim obkomom VKP(b), spravki po
nim Otdela, zakliucheniia ministerstv i vedomstv, oktiabr’ 1948-ianvar’ 1949 g., ll. 55-58.
86. TsDOO SO, f. 4, op. 44 1948, d. 14 Stenogramma zasedaniia IV plenuma Sverdlovskogo
obkoma VKP(b), 29-30 noiabria 1948 g., ll. 120-132 doklad tov. Prassa (inspektor TSK).
87. TsDOO SO, f. 4, op. 52 1954, d. 180 Statisticheskie otchety, spravki o podbore,
podgotovke, rasstanovke i smeniaemosti rukovodiashchikh partiinykh, sovetskikh,
komsomol’skikh i khoziaistvennykh kadrov oblasti, ianvar’ 1950-ianvar’ 1954 g., l. 64 Dannye
o smeniaemosti sekretarei partorg i ikh zamestitelei po GK i RK.
88. TsDOO SO, f. 4, op. 55 1956, d. 105 Informatsii Obkoma v TsK KPSS o provedenii
organizatsionno-partiinoi raboty v oblasti, l. 168.
89. Ultimately, however, “nationalism” was the most serious of the charges laid against
Georgian party leaders.
90. See for example Khrushchev’s speech to the XIX Party Congress in October 1952,
RGASPI, f. 592 XIX s’’ezd VKP(b) 5-14 oktiabria 1952 g., op. 1, d. 44 Stenogramma
desiatogo zasedaniia 10-go oktiabria. Doklad sekretaria TSk Khrushcheva, N. S., ob
izmeneniiakh v ustave VKP(b), ll. 16-19.
91. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh..., op. cit., v. 8: 286.
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plan falsification, equating them with wrecking.92 Prosecutions did follow — on
charges of counter-revolutionary crimes,93 but the signals from Moscow were not
strong enough or consistent enough to incite a broader wave of denunciations as
there had been in 1936-1938.
*
For nearly two decades, the regional organs of the political police were officially
subordinated dually: to their central counterparts and to the regional party
committee. Initially, dual subordination involved few contradictions. The local
“organs” served both masters, both in the destruction of “oppositions” and in the
promotion of ambitious economic plans. However, in the early 1930s, under the
extraordinary demands of the five-year plans, many regional party leaders
demonstrated that they had the stronger grip on the loyalties of the local political
police. The local “organs” played a crucial role in the protection of regional cliques
from the pressures of plan fulfilment. They would find and arrest “wreckers” and
“saboteurs”: those who would take the blame for production problems. The blame
shifting strategy collapsed in 1936 and contributed to the Great Terror. After that,
the centre took care to prevent the regional party and political police to collude in
the subversion of central directives. After 1939, the centre chose all local political
police agents, and carefully monitored their activities. The results of the change
were mixed at best. Not all collusion was eliminated, though the centre was much
better informed about bureaucratic malfeasance. The information came not from a
disciplined local political police, but from an almost uncontrolled tendency to
scapegoat at all levels. The close relationship of the regional party and political
police had done much to stabilise the local political order in the Soviet Union. And
that stability was not restored until after Stalin’s death, when Khrushchev eased the
pressures of plan fulfilment, restricted the powers of the political police and






92. TsDOO SO, f. 4, op. 52 1953, d. 112 Stenogramma soveshcvhaniia rabotnikov
promyshlennosti, stroitel’nykh organizatsii i transporta Sverdlovskoi oblasti, 28-29 ianvaria
1953 g., l. 181.
93. Ibid., l. 178; TsDOO SO, f. 4, op. 52 1953, d. 10 Stenogramma ob’’edinennogo plenuma
oblastnoi i gorodskoi komitetov KPSS, 13 iiunia 1953 g., ll. 74-78.
